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ARGUMENT 
The appellate court's review of the ruling on summary judgment in this matter is 
difficult since the trial court did not explain its reasoning at all. The entirety of Judge 
Henriod's review of the policy and applicable case law is found in a single sentence: 
"FennelPs complaint asserts claims which could potentially trigger coverage under the 
policy."(R.297, 301). Thus, the trial court did not find that any facts or circumstances 
outside of the four corners of the complaint triggered coverage. Instead, the trial court 
found specifically that the claims within the four corners of the complaint were those 
which triggered coverage. 
However, the trial court did not identify which claims triggered the coverage nor 
did the trial court provide any analysis as to its reasoning how specifically those claims 
triggered coverage under this particular policy. Appellate courts have ruled that on 
summary judgment where the trial court fails to identify its reasoning, the trial court 
commits reversible error. For this reason alone the matter should at least be remanded. 
Gabrielle v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App. 277, 34 P.3d 234. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) in fact requires the trial court to state its grounds where a motion for 
summary judgment is made upon more than one basis. Multiples issues were before the 
court. Among those issues specifically were whether the allegations of Fennell 
constituted an occurrence under the policy, whether the damage alleged constituted 
property damage under the policy, and whether any exclusions applied. Thus, the 
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motions before the court were based on more than one ground. As a result, the trial court 
erred in failing to state the grounds for its grant of summary judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court has pointed out that the presumption of correctness 
ordinarily afforded a trial court ruling on appeal has little operative effect when members 
of the appellate court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning because of the cryptic 
nature of its ruling. Retherfordv. AT &T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). In this case, as the record is complete and can be adjudicated as a 
matter of law, this court should hold that State Farm is entitled to summary judgment. 
The matter should be reversed with instructions to the trial court to enter an order 
consistent with the finding of no coverage under the present circumstances. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST BE DECIDED UPON THE RECORD 
Apparently acknowledging that the claims within the four corners of the Fennell 
complaint do not bestow coverage to Green, Green argues this court must instead look to 
other "facts" in a determination of this matter. Green makes this assertion even though 
the grant of summary judgment was made specifically upon the basis that coverage was 
found under the complaint. However, the additional "facts" proffered by Green do not 
change the analysis because (1) they were not properly before the district court, and more 
importantly, (2) they do not change the analysis at all. Specifically, the correspondence 
between Fennell's attorney and Layton City or letters sent from attorney Stark to Green 
do not change the nature of the claims which have been asserted. None of these 
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additional "facts and circumstances" change the analysis that the claims of Mr. Fennell all 
went to non-disclosure of information.1 
Both Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-
501 (now found in substance in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)) indicate that the 
court should confine its scope of examination on a motion for summary judgment to 
pleadings, discovery materials (depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions), 
and affidavits. In other words, the rules anticipate that a proper record will be before both 
the trial court and the appellate court. 
Accordingly, in determining the factual basis upon which the district court should 
have acted, and by which this appeal must be reviewed, only those factual statements 
Recognizing a lack of citation to the record at the trial court, Green attempts to 
supplement the appellate record in footnote two of his brief. In this footnote, Green 
refers to initial disclosures which are not part of the record before this court, and most 
importantly, were not part of the record before the trial court. Such an attempt to 
supplement the record and rely on materials not before the trial court, and not properly 
before this court, should not be countenanced. See Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 
P.2d 525, 528 n. 2 (Utah App. 1990). An appellate court's review is limited to the 
evidence contained in the record on appeal. State v. Pliego, 91A P.2d 279, \l (Utah 
1999). See accord Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 
(Utah 1985). 
Green even attempts to explain his lack of proper evidence by arguing discovery 
was truncated: "In the instant case, however, discovery regarding exactly what State Farm 
knew was curtailed by the grant of Summary Judgment." This is a blatant misstatement. 
A cursory review of the trial court's file will show that a joint discovery plan was signed 
by Green's counsel Jan. 7, 2003. R.82). A fact discovery cut-off was established for June 
30, 2003. R.84). No discovery whatsoever was undertaken be Green. State Farm's 
motion for summary judgment was filed February 5, 2004. R.88). 
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provided and supported pursuant to the rules should be considered. 
In opposition, Green misapprehends the import of State Farm's argument. State 
Farm argues two points: (1) Rule 7 (formerly 4-501) provides that factual allegations, 
properly cited to the record, that are not properly disputed are deemed admitted, and (2) 
allegations which a party wishes the court to consider on motion for summary judgment 
must be properly put before the court. Green fails to recognize the import of this second 
principle. The case law cited by Green only goes to disputing facts and has no bearing on 
proffering evidence unsupported by the record.2 Clearly, if a trial court is to render 
judgment against a party, such judgment must be based upon factual assertions properly 
before it. To hold otherwise is to invite chaos into motion practice and to make appellate 
review laborious and less meaningful. 
While the standard on summary judgment requires courts to view the facts in favor 
of the nonmoving party, the law does not require unreasonable factual inferences, nor 
does it require that the court turn a blind eye to reasonable inferences based on 
uncontested facts. Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71,1 P.3d 338. 
Inadmissable evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 
2A11 of the cases cited by Green address a failure to properly dispute facts, not a 
failure to properly put those facts before the court in the first place. See Salt Lake County 
v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, ^23 n.4, 89 P.3d 155; Johnson v. Dept of 
Trans., 2004 UT App 284, f7 n.2, 98 P.3d 773; Gary Porter Const, v. Fox Const, Inc., 
2004 UT 354, ^fl5, 101 P.3d 371. These cases also evidence a case by case review as to 
whether the failure to comply with the rules is harmless. 
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G & S Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Utah 1994); D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775 
P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). The Utah Supreme Court has held that affidavits in opposition to 
motions for summary judgment must set forth specific facts which would be admissible in 
evidence. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, 70 P.3d 904. 
See also Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). Thus, facts alleged on appeal which find no 
basis in the actual record before the appellate court cannot be considered. Moreover, for 
the purposes of reviewing the grant of summary judgment in this case, should this court 
determine that the trial court relied upon inadmissible evidence, such as assertions with 
no citation to the record, then the district court's conclusions must be overturned. 
The additional "facts and circumstances" do not add anything to the four 
corners of the complaint In Green's response in the court below and on appeal, Green 
maintains that the additional "facts" that Green put before the court are relevant and even 
dispositive. A review of these facts shows them to either be irrelevant or otherwise 
inadmissible. In fact, at most the additional information supports the conclusion of no 
coverage in the present circumstances. Green submitted these "facts" to the trial court in 
Green's principle memorandum (R. 179-180) and the facts were contested by State Farm 
in its memorandum in opposition. (R.257-259). 
Fact No. 1 Stark Letter - Notice of Claim. The first letter attached to Green's 
pleadings before the trial court provided a notice of claim between Mr. Fennell and the 
City of Lay ton. A review of the contents of that letter shows it to be a claim against the 
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City, not against Green. As such, nothing concerning the claims against Mr. Green can be 
found in this letter. Moreover, the substance of the notice of claim is that the city had 
notice of the potential of the lot to have a landslide and allowed Mr. Fennell to build a 
home on the lot anyway. Just as within the four corners of the complaint, Mr. FennelPs 
claim against the City of Layton is that Fennell relied on the non-disclosure of the city. 
Accordingly, in its substance the notice of claim does not add any information which goes 
to coverage, but only bolsters the arguments previously made by State Farm. 
Fact No. 2: Stark Letter of June 11,1999. The statements in this letter are 
identical to those within the four corners of the complaint. The Stark letter of June 11, 
1999 indicates that Fennell relied upon the professional judgment of Mr. Green and 
asserts that Green knew the lot was unstable. Again, this letter presents no facts in 
addition to those within the four corners of the complaint and only bolsters the argument 
that coverage does not attach. 
Fact No. 3: Buehler Letter of June 16,1999. This letter states no facts or 
circumstances whatsoever. Accordingly, this letter adds nothing to those allegations 
found within the four corners of the complaint. 
Fact No. 4: Buehler Letter of October 11,1999. This letter also states no facts 
or circumstances. As such, this letter does not add anything to those allegations found 
within the four corners of the complaint. Moreover, the letter only indicates that Mr. 
Buehler is forwarding all correspondence in his file, although the letter does not identify 
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the attached correspondence. Any representations by Green as to what Green believes the 
attached documentation was is inadmissible. No affidavit can be found anywhere in the 
record supporting any reference regarding contents of the "attached correspondence." 
Fact No. 5: Allan Campbell (State Farm) letter regarding Tericon, Inc. This is 
a letter informing the parties that State Farm has engaged a company to review the 
landslide. No allegations or facts vis-a-vie Green are reviewed or stated. As such, this 
letter adds nothing to the four corners of the complaint. 
Fact No. 6: Paul Belnap letter to State Farm of May 8, 2000. The letter from 
Mr. Belnap to State Farm states no facts or circumstances or allegations or any 
information regarding claims made against Mr. Green. As such, the Belnap letter adds 
nothing to the four corners of the complaint. 
Fact No. 7: State Farm Reservation of Rights Letter of May 11, 2000. Again, 
this letter states no facts or circumstances which add anything to the four corners of the 
complaint. In fact, the facts and circumstances or allegations are not outlined at all. 
However, this letter (R.249) does reserve any other defenses State Farm may have under 
the policy. As such, the most that this letter does is undermine Green's assertion that 
State Farm has waived any provisions of the policy. 
Fact No. 8: Travelers Insurance Extension of Defense. As this court will note, 
there is no citation to the record and nothing can be found throughout the entire file 
concerning Travelers. It is simply asserted that Travelers extended the defense and did 
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not withdraw it. This fact, standing alone, is wholly irrelevant to a determination of 
coverage under the State Farm policy. While the allegation is made concerning 
Travelers' position, the actual policy language of the Travelers' policy is noticeably 
absent from the record and from Green's analysis. 
Fact No. 9: State Farm letter of September 6, 2000 denying claim. This letter 
does not add any facts or circumstances which lead to a conclusion of coverage. All this 
letter exhibits is that State Farm took a position that the policy did not cover this loss. 
This position has been consistent and is the position of State Farm on appeal. 
Fact No. 10: Green paid for the defense of his case through conclusion. Again, 
there is no citation to the record, no affidavit from Green, and no evidence otherwise 
supplied to support this conclusion. However, even if the information were accurate, it 
would not be relevant to a determination of coverage. 
Likewise, quotations from insurance adjustors are not relevant to a determination 
of coverage in this matter. As this court is most certainly aware, at the beginning stages 
of any claim, insurance adjustors attempt to evaluate a worse case scenario in any matter. 
This helps an insurance company investigate the claim further and set the reserves for a 
claim. The citations by Green in internal reports do not discuss the actual nature of 
Fennell's claims, and most importantly, are not an evaluation as to coverage at all. 
Nothing in general reports from State Farm nor any of the correspondence from any other 
parties indicate that the nature of Mr. Fennell's claims were anything but a failure to 
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disclose information. 
Accordingly, in total, the asserted extra facts and circumstances at most constitute 
a smoke screen. Since these additional facts have nothing to do with allegations of 
coverage, the only thing the trial court was left to review was the four corners of the 
complaint. As a result, Green's repeated invocation of other facts and circumstances is 
simply hollow. Again, it should be noted that the trial court's conclusion and grant of 
summary judgment limits its conclusion to the Fennell complaint itself. (R.297,301).3 
THE POLICY MUST BE CONSTRUED ACCORDING TO ITS PLAIN 
MEANING 
Green's statements of general insurance principles must be taken in context, 
specifically the context of the cases out of which they arose. The insuring clause of a 
policy is not construed against an insurer. In fact, in the absence of a finding of 
ambiguity, policy provisions are not construed against insurance companies. The Utah 
Supreme Court pointed out in Alf v. State Farm Fire & Casualty. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 
1275 (Utah 1993): 
An insurance policy is merely a contract between the insured and the insurer and is 
construed pursuant to the same rules applied toward ordinary contracts. Whether 
an ambiguity exists in a contract is question of law. If the policy is ambiguous, 
doubt is resolved against the insurer. However, if a policy is not ambiguous, no 
3It should be noted that Green takes these additional facts and circumstances and 
then ignores them in his own appellate brief making claims which are not supported by 
the record at all. On page 25 of Green's brief, Green states that Fennell claimed that 
Green was responsible for creating the conditions which led to the landslide. Such an 
allegation can be found nowhere in the record. 
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presumption in favor of the insured arises and the policy language is construed 
according to its usual and ordinary meaning. 
Further, the Alf court stated: "In general, a court may not rewrite an insurance contract for 
the parties if the language is clear and unambiguous[.]" Id. at 1275. 
State Farm is not hiding behind the four corners of the complaint. First, surely the 
complaint is the most accessible source as to the nature and basis of plaintiff s claims. It 
is what Green claims should have triggered coverage under the policy. Second, there are 
no additional facts or allegations which provide a separate basis for liability other than 
failure to disclose. State Farm did not ignore facts or circumstances known to it. Instead, 
in looking at all of these circumstances, State Farm made a correct determination that no 
allegations came within the insuring clause of the contract. Specifically, there exists no 
allegations of any wrong doing on Green's part which caused the landslide. The only 
allegation is that a certain condition, the propensity for a landslide, existed prior to Green 
subdividing the property, Green knew or should have known about such propensity, and 
failed to inform others of that propensity. 
THE FACTS PRESENTED BY THIS CASE DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
OCCURRENCE OR PROPERTY DAMAGE UNDER THE POLICY 
While Green states a number of general principles applicable to insurance policies 
and relationships, none of these broad statements change the fact that upon close 
examination, there simply is no coverage under the policy for the claims of this case. Out 
of the 44 cases cited and discussed in appellant's argument section of its principal brief, 
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43 are wholly ignored. Nova Casualty Co. v. Able Construction, 983 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 
1999) is addressed and mentioned by Green, as it must be because it is binding and 
determinative. However, Nova Casualty is not significantly distinguished from the 
present case. Given its similar factual basis, it remains a mystery why Green would not 
discuss the H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. North Pacific Insurance Co. case, reviewed 
hereafter. 
Claims of negligent misrepresentation are not covered. As stated, Green fails to 
address any of the case law proffered by State Farm which are specifically coverage cases 
having to do with negligent misrepresentation with the exception of Nova Casualty Co. v. 
Able Construction, 983 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 1999) which specifically addressed the 
question of whether negligent misrepresentation constitutes an occurrence. The Nova 
Casualty Court found that it did not. 
Green simply misses the mark in his argument regarding intent and negligent 
misrepresentation. First, the cases cited by Green hold that negligent misrepresentation 
carries a lesser mental state than fraud, but that does not mean that there is no mental 
state. This is exactly the principle on which the Nova Casualty court concentrated. Many 
different courts have held that a failure to disclose information does not constitute an 
occurrence. Those courts, consistent with Nova Casualty, do not look at necessarily the 
intent to defraud, but instead the intent to induce reliance which is inferred. The Nova 
Casualty court expressly stated: 
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[Njegligent misrepresentations causing investment loss or loss of other economic 
interests are considered purposeful rather than accidental for the purpose of 
insurance coverage.. . . The underlying rational of this rule is that the negligent 
misrepresentation requires intent to induce reliance and, therefore, is a subspecies 
or variety of fraud which is excluded from the policy coverage. 
Again, the same reasoning applies here. The causes of action identified in the complaint 
are in reality simply misrepresentation claims. Mr. Fennell has consistently claimed that 
his damages as they relate to Green arise out of the failure to disclose which induced him 
to purchase the lot. Fennell is explicit in his complaint that had the information been 
disclosed, the property would not have been purchased. 
The primary holding in Nova Casualty, that negligent misrepresentation claims do 
not constitute an "occurrence," is not a holding known only to Utah courts. Specific to 
insurance coverage, many courts have held that nondisclosure of information does not 
constitute an occurrence. In State Farm's principal brief, State Farm cited this court to 
eight cases in addition to Nova Casualty holding that negligent misrepresentation does not 
constitute an occurrence. Green chose to ignore these cases. None of this case law is 
distinguished. Even more significantly, no counter case law is cited or argued by Green 
at all. 
Just as in the present case, in Safeco Insurance Co. v. Andrews, 915 P.2d 500 (9th 
Cir. 1990) a property purchaser claimed that a seller misrepresented the condition of 
property, particularly concerning the fact that the property suffered from unstable earth. 
The court in Andrews held that the misrepresentations did not constitute an occurrence 
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and therefore there was no coverage under an insurance policy. The same result should 
obtain here. 
It appears from a review of the case law that many parties, like Green, are 
misdirected in insurance coverage issues simply by the presence of the word 
"negligence." It may be that the judge in the present case was likewise misdirected. A 
simple claim of negligent conduct does not necessarily bring a matter within coverage. 
Just as in Nova Casualty, many courts have held specifically that negligent 
misrepresentation, in addition to intentional misrepresentation, is outside the scope of the 
term "occurrence." See Freedman v. Cigna Ins. Co., 976 S.W. 2d 776 (Tex. App. 1998) 
("even though the [plaintiffs] added negligence as an alternative claim, the mere 
allegations of negligence does not control the issue of duty to defend. The facts alleged 
by the [plaintiffs] control, and the facts do not give rise to a duty to defend"). 
Just as in Nova Casualty, those courts focus on an inferred intent to induce 
reliance. The inducement of reliance does not even need to be inferred in the present 
matter. Within the four corners of the complaint, on multiple occasions, plaintiff claims 
that he was induced to rely upon the lack of disclosure. This is the whole heart and soul 
of FennelPs complaint. The other "facts and circumstances" so focused upon by Green 
do not lead to an alternate conclusion. In fact, the notice of claim to Layton City only 
highlights that Mr. Fennell's claim was that he had been induced to buy a piece of 
property that he otherwise would not have bought had he been fully informed. See 
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Tischimperle v. Etna Casualty and Surety Co., 529 N.W. 2d 421 (Minn. App. 1995). 
In Bush v. Shumaker-Beal 987 P.2d 1103 (Kan. App. 1999) the court was 
presented with a case where a home had termite damage and the fact of that terminate 
damage was negligently misrepresented, much like the case here. The allegations were 
that the negligent misrepresentations caused damage. However in Bush the court found: 
State Farm maintains that its insured's negligent misrepresentations, if any, were 
not the cause of any property damage; simply put, the termites, not the Beals' 
misrepresentations, caused the property damage, and Bush's claim is to recover 
economic damages. 
In the present circumstances, the damages to Fennell are not even alleged to have 
been caused by activities of Green, but instead by the preexisting condition of the lot's 
propensity to have landslides. This court should reach the same conclusion that these 
allegations constitute neither an occurrence nor property damage under the policy, 
and the same result should obtain here. 
The holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, If 16, 
94 P.3d 919 does not change this analysis in the least. Frandsen recognizes a duty of a 
developer to disclose information. This is exactly the claim which is presented in the 
Fennell complaint. This case has always involved a claim of non-disclosure. The 
analysis of coverage does not turn on whether such a duty exists. State Farm assumed the 
duty existed. There is no coverage under the policy assuming that the duty exists and 
Green breached it. 
The Frandsen decision is irrelevant to a determination of coverage because the 
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duty to defendant exists whether the allegations of the complaint are true or not. Thus, 
even when a plaintiff alleges a duty which is not recognized by law, the duty to defend 
may still exist. In this case, where one assumes that the duty exists, which the Frandsen 
decision only confirms, the conclusion still obtains that no coverage exists. 
Many of the same arguments by Green were addressed and dispatched in Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 806 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Cal. 1992). In Morgan, the buyers claimed 
that the Morgans misrepresented and failed to disclose certain facts to induce them to 
enter into a contract to purchase property. Specifically, negligent misrepresentation was 
alleged. First, the Morgan court noted that the insured, not the insurer, has the burden of 
establishing that a loss comes within the basic scope of coverage. Id. at 1463. The court 
held: 
The type of damages available for misrepresentation, failure to disclose and 
negligence are not covered under the policy because it provides coverage only for 
bodily injuries or property damages. The damages alleged in the underlying action 
are for economic or contractual losses and do not fall within the definition of 
"property damage" under the policy. 
The Morgan court further held: 
Even if the type of damages sought in the underlying action were covered under 
the policy — which they clearly are not — there was no "accident" under the 
policy. In order for coverage to exist under a given insurance policy, there must be 
an "occurrence" under the policy. 
Id. 
The court addressed the same argument Green raises here: 
Defendants' assertion that the alleged misrepresentations were unintentional and 
therefore accidental in nature is also without merit. In its previous decision in 
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Chaney {Allstate Ins. Co. v. Chaney, 804 F. Supp. 1219, 1222-1223 (N.D. Cal. 
1992)], this court discussed the authority holding that negligent misrepresentations 
do not constitute "accidents" for insurance coverage purposes. 
The court therefore held: 
Accordingly, Allstate's policy does not cover the cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation alleged in the underlying action. Moreover, neither the 
negligence claim nor the negligent misrepresentation or failure to disclose claims 
constitute claims for damages arising from an accident. 
The same result should obtain here. An allegation of failure to disclose simply 
does not come within the insuring clause of the State Farm policy. As a result, no 
coverage exists and no attendant duty to defend exists either. 
What is even more surprising is that Green fails to even address the HE. Davis & 
Sons, Inc. v. North Pacific Ins. Co.,4 case. In H.E. Davis, the court followed Nova 
Casualty holding that the allegations of a claimant did not constitute an occurrence. HE. 
Davis involved allegations that the insured had improperly performed site preparation, 
fill, and compaction of a lot where a school was supposed to be built. The Federal 
District Court in Utah cited the case of Swarts v. Woodlawn, Inc., 610 So. 2d 888, 890 
(La. Ct. 1992) which held that where policies define occurrence as an accident, courts 
have refused to find an occurrence when a contractor's liability is based only on improper 
construction. Accordingly, whether the claims are couched in terms of improper 
construction, or as Fennell actually made the claims in this case as failure to disclose 
4248 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D. Utah 2002). 
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information, an "occurrence" cannot be found. 
This court should note that the court in H.E. Davis also held that the allegations 
did not constitute "property damage" either. The court found that the plaintiffs damages 
were foreseeable economic losses, simply arises from inadequate work, and therefore did 
not qualify as "property damage." Green in no way disputes the case law from many 
jurisdictions which hold that claims of defective or poor workmanship do not constitute 
an "occurrence." 
Green's citation to Federated Mutual Ins. Co. v. Grapevine Excavation, Inc., 197 
F.3d. 720 5th Cir. (Tex. 1999) is curious because the 5th Circuit was applying Texas law. 
While the general principles announced by Federated Mutual may be correct, it is a long 
stretch to therefore contend that Texas law would hold that coverage exists in this case. 
In fact the opposite is true. A review of Texas law more analogous to the present case 
leads to the conclusion that no coverage exists. In State Farm Lloyds v. Kessler, 932 
S.W. 2d 732 (Tex. App. 1996) State Farm sought a determination that it had no duty to 
defend claims of misrepresentation against a home owner related to foundational and 
drainage problems in a home. The Texas court of appeals held that the policy, which 
covered property damage, did not cover economic damages in the form of the purchaser's 
costs to restore the home and the damages suffered did not result from an occurrence 
within the meaning of the policy which defined occurrence as an accident. In reversing a 
trial court determination that coverage attached, first the Texas court of appeals found 
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that there was no "property damage" under the allegations presented. The Kessler court 
stated: 
The Fannings' petition, as the Kessler's point out, does describe drainage and 
foundation problems. But those problems are not "property damage" for which the 
Kesslers are legally liable because the Fannings do not assert that the Kessler's 
injured the property, destroyed the property, or caused the resulting loss of use. 
Instead, the Fannings alleged that the Kessler's misrepresented the problems. The 
Kessler's allege misrepresentations did not cause the drainage and foundation 
problems; those problems existed before negotiations began. 
The Fannings do allege economic damages; that is, repair costs to restore the 
property to the condition at which the Kessler's represented it and loss of use and 
enjoyment because of the Kessler's allegedly wrongful conduct. In Texas, 
economic damages are not property damages as defined by liability insurance 
policies. In addition, the Fannings' economic damages, including loss of use, 
arose because of the Kessler's alleged misrepresentations about the property; they 
arose because the Fannings did not get the property they bargained for. 
Id. at 737. 
The court further stated: 
Even if some economic damages could fall within the definition of property 
damage (and in Texas they do not), courts uniformly hold that those resulting from 
misrepresentations do not. 
Id. citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 806 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding 
that claims alleging negligent misrepresentation and failure to disclose seek economic 
damages, not property damages within an insured's policy). 
The second point reviewed by the Kessler court was whether the allegations 
amounted to an accordance under the policy. The court held: 
Because neither an accident nor exposure to conditions caused the damages 
alleged by the Fannings, no occurrence or loss happened. Therefore, the 
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policies do not cover the damages sought by the Fannings. 
The court held that fraudulent promises, false representation, and untrue statements do not 
as a matter of law fall within the plain meaning of the definition of "occurrence." Id. at 
738. The same result of no coverage should be found in the present case. At the heart of 
the case in Kessler was an intent to reduce reliance. That same intent to induce reliance 
can be found in this case. 
Likewise in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 135 S.W. 3d 304 (Tex. App. 2003) the 
Texas court of appeals once again held that misrepresentations and omissions did not 
constitute an occurrence. The Hicks' court stated: 
We agree with Allstate that [claims of misrepresentations and failure to disclose] 
do not give rise to a duty to defend under the policy because such 
misrepresentations and failures are not accidents, and any resulting damages was 
thus not the result of an occurrence. 
Id. at 313. Citing Freedman v. Signa Ins. Co., 976 S.W. 2d 776 (Tex. App. 1998). 
THE CLAIMS OF FENNELL ARE EXCLUDED BY THE POLICY 
Green's claims are excluded by the professional services exclusion. The salient 
issue to be decided by this appeal is whether there is coverage under the policy for the 
claims of Green. Green in no way distinguishes the case law cited by State Farm in 
support of its argument that the professional services exclusion applies. Green's main 
attack is that State Farm has waived its ability to rely upon this exclusion. In other words, 
Green asks this court to ignore this exclusion. 
Green does not even dispute that the underlying complaint directly triggers the 
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professional services exclusion by claiming that Green's actions or inactions concerning 
the lot were in a professional capacity. Fennell characterizes Green as a "professional 
subdivides" and that he relied on the "professionalism and experience of the defendant." 
See f 12 of the Fennell complaint. Fennell specifically alleged: 
The subdivision plat of the land comprising Falcon Ridge Phase II was recorded by 
Defendants Green and Wall on April 22, 1994. Lot 31 was designated as a 
building lot without containing the information and recommendation of the 
geologist aforesaid. 
(R.50, TJ8). In other words, Fennell alleges that Green prepared and approved a plat map 
or drawing that failed to contain information Fennell thought should have been included. 
As such, the activities of Green come squarely within paragraph b of exclusion 10 which 
includes the preparing, approving, or failing to prepare or approve maps, drawings, 
opinions, reports, surveys, change orders, designs or specifications^] As previous argued 
with no response from Green, such actions come squarely within the professional services 
exclusions. 
The most that Green argues, without citation to any authorities, is that the policy 
does not define "professional services." In the face of this, of course, State Farm has 
presented this court with seven cases holding that even when not defined the professional 
services exclusion is unambiguous. None of this case law was distinguished by Green. 
Green in no way distinguished the explanation of State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. 
INA Insurance Co., 207 111. App. 3d 961, 567 N.E. 2d 42, 47 (1991) which explained: 
The policy at issues excludes liability coverage for personal injury or property 
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damage due to the insured's rendering of or failure to render "any professional 
service." In construing exclusions such as this, courts have adopted an expansive 
definition of the term "professional service." The term is not limited to services 
performed by persons who must be licenced by government authority in order to 
practice their professions. Rather it refers to any business activity conducted by 
the insured which involves specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, and is 
predominantly mental or intellectual as opposed to physical or manual in nature. 
Green has chosen not to even discuss Utah case law construing such an exclusion. 
In Fire Insurance Exchange v. Alsop, 709 P.2d 389 (Utah 1985) a claim had been denied 
under a professional services exclusion. In applying the exclusion to the insured's 
conduct, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The emphasis should be placed on the alleged activities or admissions of the 
insured which give rise to the claim and not upon claimants characterization of her 
legal theories of liability. 
In the present circumstances, all of the claims arise out of an allegedly improper 
designation of this property as a building lot or failure to disclose pertinent information 
regarding whether it was suitable as a building lot. In such capacity, Green was operating 
as a developer rendering professional services in determining how to divide up lots and 
where it was appropriate to build houses. Thus, the activities of which Fennell 
complained are primarily intellectual in nature and constitute professional services, which 
are excluded. Thus, no coverage exists and the duty to defend was not triggered. 
Waiver or estoppel do not apply to the professional services exclusion. 
Without citation to authority, Green claims that State Farm is precluded from arguing the 
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"professional services" exclusion.5 Utah law provides otherwise. It is well settled in 
Utah that: "The doctrine of estoppel. . . cannot be used to bring risks which were not 
covered by the terms of the policy within coverage of the policy." Perkins v. Great-West 
Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah App. 1991). Of course, Green does 
not mention the Perkins case in it's brief, apparently preferring to ignore Utah law. 
In applying Utah law, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals recognized this principle in 
United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 185 F.2d 443, 447 (10th Cir. 1950) 
(applying Utah law) where the court stated: 
[The insured] seeks to extend coverage beyond the clear terms and provisions of 
the policy on the ground of waiver or estoppel. He makes this contention on the 
ground that Carr stated and represented to him that the policy covered all its 
operations. However, it is well established in the authorities that coverage may not 
be extended by waiver or by estoppel. 
Moreover, waiver does not even apply in the present circumstances. In order for 
waiver or estoppel to apply, Green would have to show first that State Farm was 
intentional in its relinquishment of a known right6 and that Green somehow relied upon 
such waiver. However, Green cannot do this as State Farm's position has always been 
consistent: there is no coverage under the policy. Whether there is no coverage pursuant 
to the insuring clause or any specific exclusion results in the same lack of coverage. 
5Green did not argue below that waiver or estoppel applied to this case. The 
burden to show waiver or estoppel was Green's. Having not addressed this issue below, 
Green can hardly have met that burden. 
6Anderson v. Brinkerhoff 756 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah App. 1998). 
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Accordingly, Green cannot as a matter of law rely upon this decision. Moreover, Green 
does not even argue in this in this brief that he detrimentally relied on any conclusions of 
State Farm. 
Since Green cites no authority in support of his argument on waiver, it remains 
difficult to ascertain the grounds upon which Green asserts this waiver. It appears that 
Green wishes this court to hold that any provision not specifically addressed in a denial 
letter from an insurance carrier may not be argued as a basis for denial in subsequent 
litigation. This argument is known as the "automatic waiver rule." Many jurisdictions 
have addressed the issue of an "automatic waiver rule." Thirty-two of thirty-three 
jurisdictions addressing the issue have rejected it. Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 
900 P.2d 619, 636 (Cal. 1995). The reason that the automatic waiver rule has been so 
soundly rejected is because the real question which courts need to address is whether 
there ever was coverage under the policy in the first place. Coverage either existed or it 
did not. In the present matter coverage does not attach to Fennell's allegations for many 
reasons, one of which is because the allegations are precluded by the professional services 
exclusion. As a result, the district court must be reversed. 
Even if this loss were a completed operations hazard, it would be excluded. In 
an effort to otherwise find coverage in this case, Green attempts to look to the completed 
operations hazard provisions of the policy. However, Green acknowledges: 
The policy did exclude coverage for property damage to Green's work included in 
the products- completed operation hazard if the damage arose out of his work. 
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That exclusion, however, did not apply if the damaged work or the work out of 
which the damage arose was performed on Green's behalf by a subcontractor. 
Green brief at 38. Green then goes on to argue that supposedly Ivory North or Lay ton 
City were subcontractors. Otherwise, the exclusion would operate to exclude the claims 
here. There is no evidence whatsoever in the record of any subcontractor working for 
Green, It is preposterous to claim that Ivory North and Layton City are subcontractors of 
Green under the facts and circumstances before the court. Accordingly, Green's 
argument that coverage can be found and the completed operations provision of the policy 
fails. On the other hand, if Fennell's allegations are construed to allege that Green 
performed his operations on Lot 31 negligently, then Fennell's claims are excluded under 
the policy by the products completed exclusion identified above. See Product Completed 
Exclusion (R.31, exclusion 13). Either way, the determination of the trial court was in 
error and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts before the trial court could lead only to one conclusion as a matter of 
law. There is no coverage in this case. The allegations of Fennell do not constitute an 
occurrence under the policy. Further, property damages as defined in the policy cannot be 
found. Finally, all of the claims of plaintiff are excluded by the professional services 
exclusion. Even if Fennell had claimed that Green had done something improper in the 
preparation of the lot, which Fennell did not, the claim would be excluded by the products 
completed exclusion. For these reasons, the determination of the district court must be 
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reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor 
of State Farm. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 2nd day of June, 2005 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant State Farm 
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